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I. INTRODUCTION
The issuance and integrity of our nation's security classifications is of
obvious importance. Intelligence agencies within the United States must
naturally be very careful about how they execute this power to allow ac-
cess to the nation's secrets, for even in this post-Cold War period we now
live in, the ever-present threat of foreign nations (and, increasingly, state-
less organizations) requires the United States to remain ever-vigilant in
the protection of democracy. The intelligence community uses several
different systems and procedures to determine which persons may be
trusted with top-secret clearances, but many agencies share a peculiar re-
striction in common. The CIA, the FBI, and the armed forces all have
excluded homosexuals from the pool of patriotic citizens who qualify for
the important task of safeguarding our nation's secrets.
This restriction is the result of a multitude of concerns-the reliability
of persons who until recently were well known to flagrantly violate the
laws of the several states, disputes over potential mental and medical con-
ditions once believed to be inimical to homosexuality, and a recognition
that a person's fear of the disclosure of his homosexuality to his family or
community may leave him susceptible to blackmail-all enter into the
calculations of the intelligence community. But the countervailing pro-
gress of society and the lack of clear certainty over both the effectiveness
of this ban and the wisdom of its justifications are leading many to ques-
tion the continued existence of such regulations. Growing differences be-
tween courts on the federal and state levels, as well as between the
federal circuits, over the place of homosexuals in society and their place
in the rubric of equal protection (whether homosexuals remain a non-
suspect class or have "graduated" to either the semi-suspect or suspect
classifications), in addition to a strong push for the invalidation or repeal
of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, will surely force the issue upon the
courts at some point in the very near future.
Therefore, the implications of this ban, the reasons for its continued
existence, and the future of intelligence in a world that is constantly
changing on both domestic and foreign fronts demand a thorough review
of these restrictions. The traditional role of courts in reviewing the em-
ployment-related decisions of any executive agency must be examined
and applied to the special circumstances our subject presents. Addition-
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ally, courts face legitimate questions as to the status of homosexuals in
the intelligence community and in wider society. Such constitutionally
based concerns over restricting homosexuals from gaining security clear-
ances and our nation's (and courts') increasing acceptance of homosexu-
ality demand that these issues be revisited and more fully addressed.
Also necessary is a review of this policy's most publicly known restriction:
the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy,' which the Obama administration and
Congress may significantly modify or eliminate in the very near future.2
Finally, the changing nature of intelligence in the twenty-first century cre-
ates new demands and new vulnerabilities for which this country must be
prepared.
II. THE PROBLEM PRESENTED
There are many examples of an irrational, blind hatred of homosexuals
existing at all levels of the federal system, even in the present day.3 His-
torically, however, the main intelligence services of the United States-
the CIA, FBI, and the various branches of military intelligence-have
been the least hospitable to homosexual employees who only want to
serve their country.4 The history of the active exclusion of homosexuals
from employment in these agencies and the fact that these restrictions
were given the force of law may be part of the reason for this hostility.5
1. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2006).
2. Indeed, the situation vis-A-vis "Don't Ask. Don't Tell" continues changing daily.
Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2010, S. 3065, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010), availa-
ble at http://lieberman.senate.gov/assets/pdf/DADTBill.pdf. Compare News Release,
Dep't of Defense, Statement by Army Sec'y John McHugh (Apr. 1, 2010), available at 2010
WLNR 6906771 (stating that Secretary Gates had effectively put a moratorium on "Don't
Ask. Don't Tell" prosecutions), with Anne Flaherty, Army Says Gays Still Can Face Dis-
missal Secretary Backtracks, Says There's No Ban on Discharges During 'Don't Ask' Re-
view, HOUSTON CHRON., at A17 available at 2010 WLNR 7063540 ("Reversing
course, Army Secretary John McHugh warned soldiers Thursday they still can be dis-
charged for acknowledging they are gay, saying he misspoke earlier.").
3. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowl-
edging a "moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct").
4. Job Anxiety-Gays with a Government Job, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 15, 1991, at
A5, available at 1991 WLNR 4068850. For example, one man who had worked for the FBI
for twenty years was fired for admitting that he was gay. Id. Another woman settled a suit
with the CIA after she accused the organization of refusing to grant her security clearance
because she was a lesbian. Id. The CIA, in turn, explained that it "considers homosexual
or heterosexual conduct in security clearance decisions if it reflects on a person's stability,
indicates a personality disorder or could subject the person to pressure or coercion." Id.
5. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (examining previous cases that facilitated the statu-
tory banning of homosexual activity in civilian life, explaining that "[w]hen homosexual
conduct is made criminal by the law of the [s]tate, that declaration in and of itself is an




The most common way non-military intelligence agencies denied security
clearance to homosexuals (the statutory requirement that clearance re-
cipients demonstrate no "sexual perversion") is still in effect today.6
Military agencies must follow what may be the most well-known statu-
tory restriction on the employment of homosexuals in potentially sensi-
tive situations: the United States military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy, which remains in effect today and severely impacts military intelli-
gence services. 7 Like other similar provisions, it fails to proffer any par-
ticular justification for the exclusion of homosexual employees, citing
only an "unacceptable risk" of derogatory effects upon our nation's mili-
tary.8 This lack of specificity is one of the many factors that have engen-
dered continuing debate on the wisdom of the policy and numerous calls
for the Obama administration to overturn it. 9
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas has further
spurred these already numerous calls,"' and the constant pressure on the
administration has now led to the most powerful and sustained attempt to
overturn laws that discriminate against homosexuals. In the present legis-
lative session, a bill has been proposed to replace "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" with a sexual orientation non-discrimination policy for the mili-
6. Kathleen M. Graham, Note, Security Clearances for Homosexuals, 25 STrAN. L.
REv. 403. 409 (1973). Homosexuals were often denied security clearance based on their
professed "sexual perversion." Id." see also 32 C.F.R. § 154.7(q) (2009) (requiring that
"[a]cts of sexual misconduct or perversion indicative of moral turpitude, poor judgment, or
lack of regard for the laws of society" are to be considered when examining potential eligi-
bility for a security clearance).
7. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2006).
8. Id. § 654(a)(14)-(15). Indeed, the statute alludes to the fact that the military re-
quires its service members to live and work in "conditions that are often [Sipartan, primi-
tive, and characterized by forced intimacy with little or no privacy." Id. § 654(a)(12).
Without actually explaining why the presence of homosexuals would make those condi-
tions even harder to suffer, the statute goes on to say that there has been a longstanding
history in military law of banning homosexuals from service. Id. § 654(a)(13). The statute
also insists that the military must maintain policies that prevent from serving those who
threaten the "morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of
military capability." Id. § 654(a)(15).
9. NPR Morning Edition: Will Obama Press for End of 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell'? (NPR
radio broadcast Dec. 22, 2008) (transcript available at 2008 WLNR 24542180). Those call-
ing for this review include General Colin Powell; high-ranking military officials in the
Army and Navy, such as Retired Rear Admiral Jamie Barnett; and members of the House
of Representatives, including Representative Barney Frank. Id.
10. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (reversing a Texas state court decision upholding a
state sodomy ban).
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tary.'' It is important to note that the bill had 192 co-sponsors, over one-
quarter of the House, as of April 2010.12
In 1995, President Clinton issued an executive order that purported to
bar the intelligence community from refusing to issue security clearances
based solely on sexual orientation. 3 The order is less permanent than a
legislative enactment, however, and it contains several exemptions that
render it mostly ineffective.' 4 Additionally, the fact that subsequent ad-
ministrations can repeal these orders renders them transitory at best and
forever insecure.' 5  Indeed, President Clinton's executive order pre-
empted an earlier order from President Eisenhower that implicitly la-
beled homosexuality as a "sexual perversion."' 6 It should be obvious that
one's entire career and livelihood will be forever uncertain and danger-
ously prone to political and societal trends if assured only by virtue of an
easily repealed executive order.
Because "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and other restrictions remain on the
books, they may only truly be put to rest through legislative or judicial
action. Indeed, courts have recognized that discriminatory laws nega-
tively affect citizens well past that time when they were justified by na-
tional security concerns, dubious though those concerns may have been. 7
11. Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 1283, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009), available at http://lieberman.senate.gov/assets/pdf/DADTBill.pdf. The proposed
bill would explicitly proscribe the Armed Services from discriminating "on the basis of
sexual orientation," including taking any action regarding current personnel or potential
recruits. Id. § 4. A broad definition is provided for what constitutes "sexual orientation,"
which encompasses heterosexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality, and applies whether
one's sexual orientation is "real or perceived." Id.
12. H.R. 1283: Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2009 (GovTrack.us), http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 111-1283 (last visited Apr. 25, 2010).
13. Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245, 40,250 (Aug. 2, 1995).
14. Christopher Scott Maravilla, Judicial Review of Security Clearances for Homosexu-
als Post-U.S. Department of the Navy v. Egan, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 785, 786 (2001).
15. Id.
16. Exec. Order No. 10,450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apr. 27, 1953) (requiring investigation
personnel to collect information on any individual who, among other things, demonstrated
any "sexual perversion"). President Clinton's 1995 Executive Order, however, "rescinded
a directive dating from the Eisenhower administration that classified homosexuality as a
sexual perversion and said it was automatic grounds for denying a clearance." At the CIA,
Being a Gay Employee Is No Longer a Cloak-and-Dagger Matter, HousTrON CHRON., June
10, 2000, at A6, available at 2000 WLNR 9363731.
17. See, e.g., Buttino v. FBI. 801 F. Supp. 298, 302 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("[Tlhe historical
reality that 'national security' has frequently been asserted as the ostensible justification
for sweeping deprivations of equal protection which, with hindsight, are nearly universally
condemned and readily regarded as, at best, grossly disproportionate to the national secur-
ity concerns at one time asserted as justifications."). The court cites Korematsu v. United
States as an example. Id. at n.5 (citation omitted).
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No less a noted jurist than Justice Scalia is quite correct in his assertion
that Lawrence represents and requires a sea change in a great many poli-
cies, surely including the anti-homosexual policies still on the books for
the intelligence community, both civilian and military. 8 In his dissent
from Lawrence, Justice Scalia unintentionally provided a new and helpful
three-part test for overruling Supreme Court decisions and outdated leg-
islation and executive orders."9 The still extant restrictions on homosex-
ual involvement in both civilian and military intelligence communities are
primed for judicial preemption under the Scalia Test: both have had their
foundations "eroded" (if not totally destroyed) by subsequent decisions
in Romer and Lawrence; both have been the subject of a great deal of
"substantial and continuing criticism"; and both have not induced "indi-
vidual and societal reliance" that can counsel against the gains to our
national security and the restoration of homosexuals' dignity that such a
judicial action would afford.20
Even today, it is interesting to note some of the names attached to
actions in this area of litigation; these are people who have reached the
apex of political power in recent years. Thus, the implications of this is-
sue remain relevant today, and a healthy concern for the impartiality of
government officials is certainly warranted.2 Defense Secretary Robert
Gates, in particular, continues to fight these battles today as "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" comes under increasing criticism. 2 The fact of this ongoing
debate demonstrates that the intelligence community remains very con-
servative, and the same prejudices-those that have not been repealed by
executive order-that motivated persecution of homosexuals over a dec-
ade ago remain prevalent. 23 As such, a more forceful repudiation of the
old regulation is advisable.
These facts suggest that, as the Lawrence court suggests, the continued
existence of restrictions against homosexuals serving in our intelligence
18. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 591 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 587.
20. Id. at 576, 587.
21. See Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (considering former CIA
Director, now Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates's dismissal of a gay CIA employee)
Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 1991) (involving former U.S Vice Presi-
dent, then Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney's support of the discharge of a homosexual
Army officer).
22. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Repeal of 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Policy Filed in Senate,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2010, at A, available at 2010 WLNR 4481168 (discussing the ongoing
congressional debate regarding the policy's continued implementation).
23. See J. Michael Waller et al.. They're Practicing "CYA" at the CIA, UPI INSIGHr
MAG., Sept. 23, 2002. at 6. available at 2002 WLNR 11988446 (explaining that many agents
see the presence of homosexuals in their organization as the unnecessary result of political
correctness).
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services demeans these brave Americans who risk their lives for a country
and an institution that still sees them as inferior.
A. Bowers v. Hardwick
Judge Posner recognized the superficiality of the Bowers Court's dis-
cussion of the conduct in question. 4 In the sphere of the intelligence
community, the controlling federal regulation prohibiting the issuance of
security clearances to homosexuals was issued shortly after the Bowers
decision in 1987 and remains in effect to the present day.25 Post-Bowers,
it was common for courts to deny relief to the excluded homosexual, even
to commonly grant summary judgment motions by the agency in ques-
tion, thereby denying the litigant even minimal review of what may
widely be seen as an important issue of human rights in a more progres-
sive, modern context. 2
6
Worse yet, the Bowers decision prevented many courts from ruling on
the equal protection merits of security classification discrimination cases,
as those courts often felt preempted by the decision. 27 This allowed judi-
cial precedent to be established upon the back of a ruling no longer valid
today.
With the opinion in Lawrence, the United States Supreme Court struck
down a wide area of jurisprudence in one fell swoop. The fact that almost
every decision against homosexuals in the areas of intelligence agency
employment and security clearance issuance explicitly relied upon Bow-
ers in denying these citizens' due process, equal protection, and privacy
rights meant that the implications of Lawrence were widespread in this
area of the law. 28 Obviously, the Lawrence decision must necessarily call
24. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 1 (1992) ("[Jiudges know next to nothing
about the subject beyond their own personal experience, which is limited, perhaps more so
than average, because people with irregular sex lives are pretty much (not entirely, of
course) screened out of the judiciary-especially the federal judiciary, with its elaborate
preappointment investigations by the FBI and other bodies."). But see Kenji Yoshino, Sus-
pect Symbols: The Literary Argwnent for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
1753, 1759-60 (1996) (arguing that Posner may not, however, have reached a different
conclusion than the Bowers Court).
25. 32 C.F.R. § 154.7 (2009).
26. See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Federal and State Constitutional Provisions
as Prohibiting Discrimination on Basis of Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation or Con-
duct, 96 A.L.R.5th 391, 441-43 (2002) (listing cases in which courts held for federal agen-
cies and against homosexual employees and employment applicants).
27. See Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scru-
tiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1772 (1996) (emphasizing the perfunctory quality
to courts' inquiry into the historical discrimination against homosexuals).
28. See. e.g.. Doe v. Gates. 981 F.2d 1316, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (denying the Fifth
Amendment equal protection claim of a terminated, homosexual CIA employee); High
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into question these cases built on the Bowers precedent, a fact to which
the Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health court specifically referred:
"[T]he United States Supreme Court overruled Bowers, thus removing
the precedential underpinnings of the federal case law supporting the de-
fendants' claim that gay persons are not a quasi-suspect class.",29 Again,
even Justice Scalia rightfully, if reluctantly, recognized that the decision
in Lawrence put many cases directly relevant to the intelligence commu-
nity in severe doubt.3"
Justice Blackmun's prescient quoting of Justice Holmes in the former's
dissent in Bowers gave the clear reasoning of the Lawrence Court over a
decade before the latter decision.3 Justice Holmes may as well have
been speaking to the intelligence community as well when he stated that
a rule is "still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imita-
tion of the past."32
B. Effects of the Exclusion of Homosexuals from Non-Governmental
Jobs
Another difficulty with these exclusions is that they inevitably extend
into the sphere of private employment, causing harm to Americans who
are far away from Quantico or Langley.33 By 1973, the Industrial Secur-
Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting
a class action challenge of the Department of Defense's policy of investigating homosexual
employees), reh'g denied (July 23,1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir.
1989) (ratifying the Army's refusal to reenlist a homosexual servicemember); Woodward v.
United States, 871 F.2d 1068. 1074-75 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (refusing to find for a ser-
vicemember released from active duty on grounds of his homosexuality); Padula v. Web-
ster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that Bowers barred a homosexual's equal
protection claim in an employment discrimination context). But see Swift v. United States,
649 F. Supp. 596, 601 (D.D.C. 1986) (noting that, in Bowers, the Court only addressed a
homosexual's right to privacy, but not all other rights). The district court declared that the
Supreme Court's ruling in Bowers did not bar a claim of discrimination based upon a per-
son's sexual preference. Id.
29. 957 A.2d 407, 465 (Conn. 2008).
30. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186. 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the case be decided on right to privacy grounds), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
32. Id.
33. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that legally
sanctioned discrimination against homosexuals reaches beyond criminal law and touches
other areas, including the employment sphere); Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182, 184 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (stating that discrimination in a public job could lead to discrimination elsewhere).
While the court found in favor of the applicant, it cautioned that the government "not only
disqualified him from the vast field of all employment dominated by the [g]overnment but
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ity Clearance Review Office (ISCRO) refused to grant any clearances to
professed or closeted homosexuals later discovered through government
investigation who worked for private contractors.34 This inability to gain
the security clearances required for employees of many government con-
tractors meant that many homosexuals were not only unable to gain pub-
lic but also private employment. 35  Further, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the discrimination against homosexuals that Bowers sup-
ports invariably bleeds into other areas, such as employment, including
employment in the intelligence services.3 6
C. National Security Is Negatively Impacted
During the deliberations in the Buttino v. FBI case, a truly embarrass-
ing event for the intelligence community occurred: following the ruling in
High Tech Gays, the Department of Defense issued a study showing that
homosexuals, in fact, performed as good or better than the average heter-
osexual in resisting foreign intelligence pressure and in executing their
daily duties.37 This necessarily gives rise to a question about whether the
exclusion of such a dependable subset of the citizenry from the intelli-
gence services negatively impacts the security interests of the United
States.38 Considerable concerns over the effect that this ban has on mili-
tary readiness, intelligence capabilities, and the safety and efficiency of
the United States government writ large have come to the fore in recent
years.3 9 That the Watkins v. U.S. Army court expressly stated that homo-
sexuals had served with distinction for decades before their proclivities
also jeopardized his ability to find employment elsewhere." Scott, 349 F.2d at 184 (citation
omitted).
34. Kathleen M. Graham, Note, Security Clearances for Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L.
REV. 403, 404 (1973). Generally, both "open" and "closeted" homosexuals were denied
security clearances. Id.
35. Id.
36. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. MICHAEL A. MCDANIEL, PRESERVICE ADJUSTMENT OF HOMOSEXUAL AND HETr-
EROSEXUAL MILITARY ACCESSIONS: IMPLICATFIONS FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE SUITrAIL-
rY 21 (1989), http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/reading-room/228.pdf.
38. See Liz Sidoti, 9,488 Leave Military Due to Policy on Gays, DESERET MORNING
NEWS (Salt Lake City, Utah), Feb. 25, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 2891506 (citing a
disproportionate departure of intelligence officers discharged under the policy); Recruiting
Troubles Force Reconsideration, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.). Dec.
26, 2008, at B6, available at 2008 WLNR 24751800 (questioning the appropriateness of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in the face of a shortage of quality recruits and personnel in the
armed forces).
39. Liz Sidoti, 9,488 Leave Military Due to Policy on Gays, DESERET MORNING NEWS
(Salt Lake City, Utah), Feb. 25, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 2891506; Recruiting Trou-
bles Force Reconsideration, VIRGINIAN-PILor & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk, Va.). Dec. 26,
2008, at B6, available at 2008 WLNR 24751800.
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were discovered40 strongly suggested that this ban was ill-considered at
least and quite harmful at worst.
The potentially negative impact that these exclusions have upon the
national security of the United States is best shown by the persons within
these agencies who actively worked against them, either from a convic-
tion that the policies are morally wrong or in order to further those gov-
ernmental interests that have been hurt by the dismissal of experienced
career employees. 41 These actions often continued the long tradition of
turning a blind eye to homosexuality when it was convenient for an
agency to do so.42 But in so doing, the agencies run the risk that if discov-
ered, their actions may effectively commit them to support the continued
employment of experienced homosexual employees.43
It is impossible for the various sensitive intelligence agencies in the
United States to have successfully excluded every homosexual from ser-
vice, and thousands of homosexuals have served their country proudly
while strangers in their own land. In fact, if the agencies did wish to ex-
clude every possible person who could fall under their suspicion, they
would potentially deny themselves the services of the approximately
thirty-seven percent of males who have had at least one homosexual ex-
perience in their lifetimes44-an action that the Norton v. Macy court,
back in 1968, already knew was "absurd., 45 Still, other courts were will-
ing to accept the government's contentions at face value, especially in the
area of military intelligence.46
Most relevant to the concerns of many is Justice Blackmun's plea at the
end of his dissent in Bowers that the Court not violate values that are
40. 875 F.2d 699, 709 (9th Cir. 1989).
41. See id. at 701-02 (describing the honest and successful service of an openly gay
Army officer who was denied reenlistment based upon his admitted sexual orientation).
42. See, e.g., id. (citing one Army officer's admission to the Corps even after admit-
ting in writing to having homosexual proclivities).
43. See id. at 708 (stating that the government can be estopped if its acts "threaten to
work a serious injustice and the public's interest will not be unduly damaged by the imposi-
tion of estoppel" (citation omitted)).
44. ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 623 (1948).
The distinction between persons who have engaged in homosexual activity and persons
who are "homosexual" was noted. Id.; see also Nathaniel McConaghy, Heterosexuality!
Homosexuality: Dichotomy or Continuum, 16 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 371, 411 (1987)
(supporting Kinsey's admittedly surprising numbers' applicability in a modern context).
45. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1167 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (citing ALFRED C. KIN.
SEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 623 (1948)).
46. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 635 (2d Cir. 1998) (asserting that
legislation pertaining to any aspect of the military "is entitled to 'a strong presumption of
validity,' and must be sustained if 'there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification"' (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312.
319-20 (1993))).
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deeply rooted in our nation's history-including diversity and tolerance
of nonconformity, which values the military, the CIA, and the FBI were
all established to protect-by excluding homosexuals from the wider cul-
ture of our nation. a7
D. The International Perspective
As the majority and the dissenters noted in Lawrence, even the Bowers
Court rightfully recognized the importance of "values we share with a
wider civilization '4' and, so, we must briefly review the status of the ho-
mosexual in similarly situated intelligence services of our forebears and
allies. When we consider the homosexual's place under our equal protec-
tion standards, we must constantly remind ourselves that the freedom
homosexuals seek to work, live, and love is now seen as an essential com-
ponent of personal liberty in Judeo-Christian culture, as Chief Justice
Burger noted years ago in his concurrence in Bowers.a9
It must be noted that a multitude of militaries in the world today allow
homosexuals to serve openly. Even a cursory search of the relevant in-
formation shows that most of the United States' closest traditional al-
lies-Australia, most European Union countries, Canada, and Israel, to
name only several-allow such service."' More telling is a partial list of
those countries that agree with the United States' current stance on ho-
mosexual service, which includes dubious powers such as Iran, Saudi Ara-
bia, and most Middle Eastern nations, which outlaw homosexuality
generally."' It is clear that the great weight of the concern for the moral-
ity and history we share with other nations to which Justice Burger al-
luded now comes down firmly on the side of allowing homosexuals to
serve their country openly.
The most relevant precedent from the courts of our sister democracies
is represented in a recent ruling of the European Court of Human Rights.
In this case, Smith v. United Kingdom, the court reviewed the petitions of
two officers of the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force. 2 The case of one
47. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 214 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), over-
ruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
48. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
49. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
50. HUM. Rrs. CAMPAIGN, REPEAL DADT Now: NOT TOMORROW. NOT NEXT
YEAR. Now 2 (2010), http://www.hrc.org/sites/repealdadt/pdfs/RepealDADT_- Talking
Points_3_10.pdf; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORr TO U.S. SEN. JOHN W.
WARNER, HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN FOREIGN COUN-
TRIES 5 tbl.1 (1993), http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/GAO.pdf.
51. Don't Ask. Don't Tell Fact Sheet, http://www.logcabin.org/logcabindc/DontAsk
DontTellFactSheet.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
52. 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493, 494 (1999).
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of those officers, Mr. Graeme Grady, has particular relevance to the sub-
ject at hand. Grady was a sergeant in the Royal Air Force, with a prestig-
ious and highly sensitive job at the British Defence Intelligence Liaison
Service (North America) in Washington, D.C.53 Grady served with dis-
tinction and, as a necessary function of his position, was regularly in con-
tact with intelligence officials from other countries, including (ironically
enough) the United States.54 After being discovered as a homosexual,
Grady was dismissed from the service for reasons that sound very similar
to those underlying restrictions of homosexual service in both the United
States military and civilian services.55 The court found these reasons en-
tirely unconvincing and wholly unsupported by the evidence. 56 Finally,
the court found that the restriction violated Article 8 (privacy, a right not
specifically enumerated in our Constitution), Article 13 (effective rem-
edy, roughly comparable to due process rights under the Fifth Amend-
ment), and Article 14 (equal protection, also found in our Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments) of the European Convention on Human
Rights, and ordered the United Kingdom to come to an agreement with
Grady over how to redress these violations. 57
This result necessarily begs the question: how can a ban on homosexu-
als defending their country through the intelligence services be entirely
proper in the United States but wholly objectionable in Europe, in which
a majority of our laws and culture originated and which is home to the
very same precedent and culture the Supreme Court used to justify its
decision in Bowers?5
8
III. DEFERENCE AND INTELLIGENCE-RELATED
EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS
Throughout the relatively short history of the intelligence services,
courts have repeatedly held that the CIA and other intelligence agencies
are not bound by traditional legislative enactments that ordinarily limit
53. Id. at 503.
54. Id.
55. Compare id. at 512-13 (citation omitted) ("[Hlomosexual behavi[or] can cause
offen[s]e, polari[z]e relationships, induce ill-discipline and, as a consequence, damage mo-
rale and unit effectiveness."), with 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (2006) ("The presence in the
armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual
acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability.").
56. Smith, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 495 ("The [c]ourt notes the lack of concrete evidence to
substantiate the alleged damage to morale and fighting power that any change in the policy
would entail.").
57. Id. at 544.
58. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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the powers of federal agencies in employment decisions . 9 The issuance
of security clearances by executive agencies outside of the Department of
Defense is governed by executive order.60 Although President Clinton
restricted the effect that anti-homosexual regulations had on clearance
applicants, President Eisenhower's executive order establishing the re-
quirements for the same6 is still controlling. Those federal agencies that
Congress has not exempted from Office of Personnel Management con-
trol and the Administrative Procedure Act have homosexuals openly in
their employ and are not allowed to exclude such persons even from sen-
sitive employment without absolute individualized proof that it would
harm the interests of the United States.6 2 As a result, homosexuals are
allowed to serve openly and honorably in several agencies that are just as
sensitive as those agencies that are exempted from the standard rule.
In reviewing the employment- and classification-related determinations
of the intelligence community, courts enter an area of traditional judicial
deference to the government. 63 Courts recognize the obvious truth that
in matters of intelligence, a strong tradition of deference is required in
order to safeguard our nation's secrets. 64 But this does not mean that
courts are entirely without power in intelligence-related cases. Indeed,
there is a long line of cases that make it clear that those agencies' admin-
istrators' exercise of judgment is entirely reviewable by courts. 65 In Doe
59. See Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988).
The Court accordingly has acknowledged that with respect to employees in sensitive
positions "there is a reasonable basis for the view that an agency head who must bear
the responsibility for the protection of classified information committed to his custody
should have the final say in deciding whether to repose his trust in an employee who
has access to such information."
Id. (quoting Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546 (1956)): Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 100
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the FBI is exempt from congressional statutory schemes typi-
cally governing civil service); Christopher Scott Maravilla, Judicial Review of Security
Clearances for Homosexuals Post-U.S. Department of the Navy v. Egan, 13 S'r. THOMAS L.
REV. 785, 795 (2001) (noting that while an agency may not impede an individual's constitu-
tional rights, it may make employment decisions at its own discretion).
60. Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995), reprinted at 50
U.S.C. § 435 (2006).
61. Exec. Order No. 10,450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2.489 (Apr. 27, 1953).
62. Ashton v. Civiletti, 613 F.2d 923, 928-30 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (requiring that an FBI
employee "could properly be dismissed only for failing to perform his duties satisfactorily
and without prejudice to the FBI's achievement of its law-enforcement mission" (emphasis
added)).
63. See, e.g., Doe v. Casey, 796 F.2d 1508, 1520-21 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that great
deference is owed to the Director of the CIA regarding personnel decisions), affd in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
64. Egan, 484 U.S. at 529-30.
65. E.g.. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (stating "that where Congress in-
tends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear");
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v. Casey, the court was even kind enough to provide examples of several
situations in which an employment or classification decision of the Direc-
tor of the CIA is reviewable: race, gender, and, somewhat humorously,
hair color.66
Additionally, an intelligence employee may be terminated only if his or
her continued employment would be contrary to the interests of the
United States.67 As a logical result, it is altogether permissible to assume
that Congress did not mean to prohibit consideration of constitutional
claims arising from the employment actions of the intelligence commu-
nity. Therefore, it is well established that an administrator's decision to
terminate an employee cannot be a "wholly irrational, vindictive or even
blatantly unconstitutional action."68
But this review must not expand into an impermissible inquiry into the
mere wisdom of a termination; it must simply seek to curtail decisions
that are "'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law."' 6 9 In finding that terminations or denials of
security clearances were proper, courts have usually required something
more than passing references to the problems homosexuals could con-
ceivably cause in the intelligence community.7 ° Especially in occupations
covered by the Administrative Procedure Act, a mere assertion of con-
cern over homosexual employment does not justify government obsti-
nacy.71 As a result of the D.C. Circuit's thorough review of the key
reasons for deference in intelligence cases, 72 Casey became a crucial step-
ping stone in the development of courts' discretion in these matters.
The high water mark of this period of judicial deference to intelligence
agencies appeared in 1990, when the Ninth Circuit found that govern-
mental agencies were entirely justified in using controversial investiga-
tory policies and procedures (such as asking an applicant the last time he
masturbated with someone else, when it last occurred, and with whom) in
Doe, 796 F.2d at 1516-17 (reasoning that had Congress intended for the Director of the
CIA's personnel decisions to be unreviewable, it could have more carefully legislated to
that effect).
66. Doe, 796 F.2d at 1517-18.
67. Id. at 1522 ("At the very least, the CIA would have to justify why such a ban on
the employment of all homosexuals was 'necessary or advisable in the interests of the
United States."').
68. Id. at 1518.
69. Id. at 1520 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006)).
70. See, e.g., Wentworth v. Laird, 348 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (D.D.C. 1972) (finding that
homosexual employee's mere susceptibility to potential blackmail is insufficient justifica-
tion for termination of security clearance).
71. See Swift v. United States, 649 F. Supp. 596, 603 (D.D.C. 1986) (refusing the
State's motion to dismiss on grounds that the APA does not apply to the White House).
72. Doe, 796 F.2d at 1521-22.
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order to determine if an applicant for or holder of a security clearance
was homosexual. 73 This was a period where a simple handwritten letter
claiming that a person was homosexual was more than sufficient to cause
the government to investigate and revoke the employee's security
clearance."4
By this time, however, those courts that had attempted to impose some
limits upon the procedures that the government could use in its investiga-
tory efforts found that such judicial efforts would often have little or no
effect.7 5 But this period of deference ended quite suddenly later in the
1990s, when several landmark cases exposed deeply institutionalized, ir-
rational hatred toward homosexuals. In one rather infamous case, a for-
mer FBI agent was able to establish that the FBI treated homosexual
employees far differently and monitored them far more closely than their
heterosexual counterparts.7 6 Agent Frank Buttino established that the
FBI would often initiate proceedings against even the most decorated of
agency veterans on the mere assertion of homosexuality by a third
party.77 Additionally, the federal district court found that the average
heterosexual FBI agent charged with "lack of candor" received censure
and a suspension without pay for seven to sixty days, as opposed to
homosexuals, who would be terminated for their "lack of candor" in try-
ing to keep their orientations hidden.7 " Most damaging to the FBI in
Buttino v. FBI was the fact that several former agents gave evidence (un-
disputed by the FBI) showing that anti-gay discrimination was rampant in
the department. 79 This testimony, when combined with internal informa-
tion proving the FBI's "significant interest" in anything hinting of homo-
sexuality within its ranks, was more than sufficient to establish the FBI's
irrational bias.8" The FBI Director's repeated and unintentionally hu-
morous statements to several courts denying that he had any "out" homo-
73. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 563 (9th Cir.
1990), reh'g denied (July 23, 1990).
74. See Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298, 300 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (describing a situation
in which the FBI received an undated, handwritten letter that launched a massive investi-
gation into the personal life of an FBI agent, whose security clearance was ultimately re-
voked upon the FBI's verification of the agent's homosexuality).
75. See Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Federal and State Constitutional Provisions
as Prohibiting Discrimination on Basis of Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation or Con-
duct, 96 A.L.R.5th 391, 478-79 (2002) (discussing the impact of the limitations set by courts
in this area).
76. Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 300.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 304.




sexuals in his employ certainly did not help the agency's case either.8 1
Even more egregiously, the FBI, after finding a homosexual among its
ranks, would often force that person to disclose private sexual histories
into childhood and often used pressure in order to force a person into
"outing" other homosexuals in the FBI, creating what one could gener-
ously term "witch hunts.
8 2
Looking at the Buttino decision, it becomes clear that many of the re-
strictions placed upon homosexuals are entirely artificial, and in the past,
courts have not required sufficient justification for those restrictions in
the cases that have appeared before them. The need for judicial interven-
tion in egregious cases like Buttino is what drove the decline of deference
to the individual intelligence agencies seen in the 1990s and led to the
more critical standard that exists today.
IV. COMMON JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE EXCLUSION OF HOMOSEXUALS
FROM SENSITIVE POSITIONS
Often, the mere assertion of homosexuality would be enough to dismiss
a government employee or to deny her a security clearance. 83 In an at-
tempt to solidify its reasons for such an action, the government would cite
homosexuals' alleged poor judgment, untrustworthiness, or susceptibility
to blackmail.84 The High Tech Gays ruling further supported the pre-
sumption that homosexuals are a much greater security risk than other
Americans.8 5 Eventually, the standard reasons that agencies gave for ex-
cluding homosexuals from service coalesced around a few main justifica-
tions-some much more developed and reasonable than others.
A. Susceptibility to Blackmail
The intelligence community's blackmail justification is among the most
cited reasons for terminating homosexual employees. This justification
arose from intelligence agencies' understandable concern that centered
on the possibility that foreign intelligence services may try to use the
moral approbation or illegality of homosexuality to blackmail agents.8 6
81. Buttino, 801 F. Supp. at 305.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g.. id. at 300 (describing the case of an FBI agent who lost his security clear-
ance and job as soon as the FBI caught wind that he was a homosexual).
84. Kathleen M. Graham, Note, Security Clearances for Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L.
REv. 403, 409 (1973).
85. See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 575 (9th
Cir. 1990) (holding that the Department of Defense had a rational interest in conducting
extensive investigations of homosexual applicants for employment), reh'g denied (July 23,
1990).
86. Id. at 568.
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Newfound criticism comes mostly as a by-product of the weakening of
what was the most powerful justification for the blackmail concern-the
forced outing of homosexuals by the Soviet Committee for State Security
(KGB). 7 Some facts have come to the fore in questioning the continued
validity of this blackmail concern: first, in 1992, the KGB ceased to exist
and there is no evidence that its successor organization (the Russian FSB)
has continued such a targeted mission; and second, the fact that the FBI
has not provided evidence after High Tech Gays that the Soviet Union
was ever successful at its attempt to recruit homosexual American spies.
A more contemporary approach can be seen in those cases where deni-
als of security clearances affected the fully "out" homosexual. This open-
ness often would create problems for the United States at trial when the
employee's laudable honesty would fatally undercut the blackmail ex-
cuse.88 The blackmail rationale, ironically, was most often undercut when
an agent charged as a homosexual made a very public and well-known
federal case over his dismissal based on supposed privacy concerns.8 9
B. Illegality
Concerns over illegality arose from the fact that sodomy was, until re-
cently,9" illegal in a significant minority of states, a fact that played a ma-
jor role in causing the average homosexual to naturally fear being
discovered breaking the law. Former FBI Director William Webster re-
ferred to this eventuality when he stated that there was a "potential for
87. Id. at 577.
88. See, e.g., Ashton v. Civiletti, 613 F.2d 923, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (relating former
FBI employee's affidavit, in which he explained that when questioned by the FBI regard-
ing his sexuality, he openly admitted that he was gay and was then terminated). The D.C.
Circuit ultimately found that because the FBI assured its non-probationary, non-investiga-
tive employee that he would only be terminated for job-related reasons and not based on
his admitted sexuality, the employee's due process rights were violated when he was, in
fact, terminated for being a homosexual. Id. at 931.
89. See, e.g., McKeand v. Laird, 490 F.2d 1262, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 1973) (Peckham, J.,
dissenting) (attacking the majority's finding that termination of employee of Department
of Defense contractor based on employee's undisclosed homosexuality was legitimately
based on national security concerns).
Of course, any homosexual with a security clearance will fear disclosure-if not to his
family and friends, at least to the government-as long as the Department of Defense
continues to revoke security clearances on a mere finding of homosexuality. How-
ever, the Department of Defense easily can cure the danger to national security alleg-
edly posed by all homosexuals. It can abandon its arbitrary system of revoking
security clearances solely on a finding of homosexuality and, thus, end homosexuals'
fears that public exposure will cost them their security classifications.
Id.
90. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (overruling former decisions up-
holding state sodomy bans).
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compromise" for those who participated in what was then illegal
conduct. 9 '
Thankfully, this justification was sent to a well-deserved grave as a re-
sult of the Lawrence decision. The Lawrence Court, in striking down an
anti-sodomy statute, noted that "[sodomy] laws were arbitrarily enforced
and thus invited the danger of blackmail. 9 2 Nationwide invalidation of
such laws necessarily undercut that inherent danger.
C. Morality
Although usually hidden, this area of concern is one that remains with
us today. Recently, when questioned by the Chicago Tribune, General
Peter Pace, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that he
"believe[d] homosexual acts between two individuals are immoral."9 3
This continuing fight over morality is unfortunate in this context, as schol-
ars have criticized the fact that homosexuals are discriminated against for
no better reason than the enforcement of certain intelligence officers'
moral codes or a general feeling that homosexuals are intrinsically disor-
dered.9 4 But a morality-based argument may not withstand a rational ba-
sis analysis.9 5
Furthermore, courts have repeatedly recognized that they are required
to guard against the possibility that an agency's claim of "immorality" to
justify denying homosexuals employment is simply an attempt to elimi-
nate all homosexuals from the service through the imposition of "Olym-
pian" standards of rectitude. 96 In a particularly strong statement that
indicts, in part, the intelligence community's restrictions against homo-
sexuals, the California Supreme Court declared that all restrictions
against homosexuals require that "courts must look closely at classifica-
91. Ashton, 613 F.2d at 927 n.5 (citation omitted).
92. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
93. William Neikirk & Karoun Demirjian, Pace Takes Fire on Gays Remark, CHI.
TRII., Mar. 14, 2007, at 3, available at 2007 WLNR 4788556. But on February 2, 2010.
current Chairman, Admiral Mike Mullen, stated in a Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing: "Speaking for myself and myself only, it is my personal belief that allowing gays
and lesbians to serve openly would be the right thing to do." John J. Kruzel, Gates Ap-
points Panel for Potential End of 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell,' Feb. 2, 2010, http://www.jcs.mil/
newsarticle.aspx?lD=219.
94. E.g., Kathleen M. Graham, Note, Security Clearances for Homosexuals. 25 STAN.
L. REv. 403, 409 (1973).
95. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that mere moral
disapproval of a certain group will not suffice to uphold a discriminatory statute).
96. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1163-64 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("The courts have, it
is true, consistently recognized that the [government] enjoys a wide discretion in determin-
ing what reasons may justify removal of a federal employee: but it is also clear that this
discretion is not unlimited." (footnote omitted)).
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tions based on [sexual orientation] lest outdated social stereotypes result
in invidious laws or practices.""
D. Candor
The Buttino court recognized a central weakness in the candor concern
when it examined the FBI's investigations. The court noted that the
"problem" with the FBI's homosexual employees was largely of the intel-
ligence community's own making, remarking that the requirement that
homosexual employees be both "open" (in that these employees were
expected to fully divulge their sexuality as it was deemed relevant to the
integrity of the agency's personnel investigations) and "discreet" (in that
employees were expected not to be homosexual or to divulge that they
were, lest unsavory foreign intelligence organizations use that informa-
tion in order to blackmail them) was prima facie ridiculous and obviously
could not be met by any employee so situated.9 8 It was clear to the court
that, but for the FBI's history of anti-homosexual discrimination, Buttino
would not have been forced to deny his orientation and, thus, violate the
FBI's candor regulations.
The FBI is not the only agency to rely upon violation of candor re-
quirements as a reason to terminate homosexual intelligence employees.
The CIA made it clear that an agent's failure to disclose his sexuality was
a severe violation of its own candor expectations, regardless of the fact
that the CIA's very own anti-homosexual regulations worked to create
this problem of non-disclosure in the first place.9 9 As a result, this con-
stant fear of a CIA investigation of one's private life was perversely the
main motivation behind many agents' lack of candor. ""
97. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 443 (Cal. 2008) (citation omitted) (emphasis in
original), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONsr. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized
in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
98. See Buttino v. FBI. 801 F. Supp. 298, 313 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
[Tihis [c]ourt is simply acknowledging that the [E]qual [Pirotection Clause of the
United States Constitution is at least implicated where a government agency allegedly
turns a certain class of its own employees into security risks by its own policies, and
then cites that 'security risk' as the basis for the termination of a member of the af-
fected class.
Id.
99. See Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (recognizing that the rea-
son for Doe's lack of candor was his fear of the CIA discovering his homosexuality and
terminating his employment, which it did).
100. See. e.g., id. (describing Doe's motivation for failing to disclose his homosexual-




Another justification plays on long-held stereotypes of homosexuals.
Intelligence agencies and courts have voiced their concerns over the
mental and emotional stability of homosexual employees, charging that
homosexuals as a group suffer from some mental defect that renders
them unsuitable for service in the intelligence community." 1 These con-
cerns were largely disproven by 1973 and have continued to be criticized
and dismissed since. 10 2 Any mental problems that did crop up among
homosexual intelligence employees tended to be a direct result of the
forced closeting that naturally resulted from the restrictions placed upon
homosexual employees by their respective agencies.103
101. See Norton, 417 F.2d at 1166. In upholding a NASA dismissal of a homosexual
employee, the court stated, "The homosexual conduct of an employee might bear on the
efficiency of the service in a number of ways ... it may in some circumstances be evidence
of an unstable personality unsuited for certain kinds of work." Id.; DONALD WEBSTER
CORY. THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA: A SUBJECTIVE APPROACH 270-77 (1975), excerpt
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/assault/context/employment.
html.
The conclusion of the subcommittee that a homosexual or other sex pervert is a secur-
ity risk is not based upon mere conjecture. That conclusion is predicated upon a care-
ful review of the opinions of those best qualified to consider matters of security in
Government. namely, the intelligence agencies of the Government. Testimony on this
phase of the inquiry was taken from representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence services of the Army,
Navy and Air Force. All of these agencies are in complete agreement that sex per-
verts in Government constitute security risks. The lack of emotional stability which is
found in most sex perverts and the weakness of their moral fiber, makes them suscep-
tible to the blandishments of the foreign espionage agent.
DONALD WEBSTER CORY, THE HOMOSEXUAL IN AMERICA: A SUBIJECIIVE APPROACH
270-77 (1975), excerpt available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/assault/
context/employment.html; Gregory B. Lewis, Barriers to Security Clearances for Gay Men
and Lesbians: Fear of Blackmail or Fear of Homosexuals?, 11 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RES. AND
THEORY 539 (2001), available at 2001 WLNR 12616641 ("Cold War fears that homosexuals
were disloyal or susceptible to blackmail sparked prohibitions on federal employment and
security clearances for gay men and lesbians, but the homosexual's presumed moral weak-
ness and emotional instability played at least as important a role.").
102. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1130 (N.D. Tex. 1982) ("Although society-
and courts-may still grapple with this question, in 1973 the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion removed homosexuality from its list of psychic disorders."), rev'd on other grounds.
769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985).
103. See Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34
S. TEX. L. REV. 205, 241 (1993) (discussing the effects of societal pressures on
homosexuals).
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V. DUE PROCESS
In previous eras of this area of litigation, it was entirely common for
courts to overlook due process concerns in favor of simply disposing of
claims concerning fundamental constitutional rights as no more than ad-
ministrative matters best left to the discretion of the individual agen-
cies.'0 4 The disregard for basic constitutional questions raised by this
policy led to clear abuses of the system. A particularly egregious example
occurred when the FBI sent dozens of letters to law schools clearly stat-
ing that it did not automatically dismiss or suspend homosexuals.,
0 5
Those schools would subsequently expose this assertion as a complete
fabrication.'0 6 Instead of sanctioning the FBI for lying about its homo-
sexual exclusion policy when it was challenged by an employee, the D.C.
Circuit overlooked the FBI's indiscretion, saying that although those let-
ters cited specific FBI policy, they were still not sufficient to show the
FBI's clear intent to discriminate and did not establish FBI policy.' 7
To ignore the fact that some agencies during this period often utilized
flimsy justifications in order to exclude homosexuals would effectively
deny affected persons their due process rights. As mentioned previously,
then-Director of the FBI, William Webster, gave an excellent example of
such a flimsy justification in 1979.118 The Ashton v. Civiletti case reveals
the ridiculousness of extending this policy to file clerks pushing mail carts
through the J. Edgar Hoover building, to whom Webster stated the policy
would also apply.'0 9 Webster went on to state that heterosexual employ-
ees who commit adultery should be and are treated differently than ho-
mosexual employees, justifying the difference by stating that the FBI
intended to "stay out of people's private lives."' "o Apparently, the irony
104. Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Federal and State Constitutional Provisions as
Prohibiting Discrimination on Basis of Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation or Conduct,
96 A.L.R.5th 391, 475 (2002).
105. Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
106. See id. at 101 (revealing that the FBI is, in fact, highly unlikely to hire
homosexuals).
107. Id.
108. Ashton v. Civiletti, 613 F.2d 923, 927 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
When asked whether the Bureau had dismissed a file clerk for being a homosexual, Web-
ster replied, in part:
Traditions in law enforcement and I've checked around all the different federal agen-
cies and I know the posture in state and local law enforcement has been that there is a
potential for compromise for those who engage in such conduct which is generally not
approved by society, and in some places, illegal. Now, we treat it as a factor, and I
must say in candor, it's a significant factor.
Id.
109. Id. at 927 (citation omitted).
110. Id. at n.5 (citation omitted).
20101
THE SCHOLAR
of that statement was entirely lost on the Director. Nevertheless, the due
process and equal protection concerns brought about by this line of ques-
tioning are obvious.
Several government organizations have been forced to address the due
process concerns implicated by the denial of security clearances to homo-
sexuals."' These organizations repeatedly assert that homosexuals are
not barred automatically as a result of their orientation, but rather it is
simply a cosmic coincidence that all homosexual applicants for such clear-
ances have been denied.'12 A denial of security clearance in such a situa-
tion constitutes an impermissibly arbitrary government action and,
therefore, equates to a denial of due process. While there is certainly no
right to government employment or to a security clearance, persons must
be terminated or denied employment by means that comport with the
Due Process Clause." 3 Further, multiple incidents of homosexuals re-
ceiving from less representative agency boards far more severe punish-
ments for their alleged transgressions raises questions over whether due
process is less than what is truly due homosexuals, as agency procedure
for dismissing homosexual employees need only meet the barest level of
procedural rigor in order to be deemed sufficient under due process
inquiry.
There are some cases in which courts were willing to intervene, such as
when agencies would discover their agents' hidden homosexuality only
after a long career of service. In one such case, the D.C. Circuit decided
that there was no fair reason justifying the denial of due process to a
homosexual employee when that employee had been gainfully employed
by the agency for more than a decade with a stellar record, often with
excellent peer and supervisor reviews. 114
Unfortunately, for a litany of reasons, litigants have generally failed to
assert the due process claims evident in such arbitrary decisions.' 15 In the
111. Kathleen M. Graham, Note, Security Clearances for Homosexuals, 25 STAN. L.
REV. 403, 420 (1973).
112. See id. (examining officials' claims that homosexuals are not categorically denied
security clearances).
113. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1163-64 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (pointing out that fed-
eral legislation prevents protected civil servants from dismissal unless dismissal would
"promote the efficiency of the service"). Reasons for dismissal can include "notoriously
disgraceful conduct," immoral conduct, and anything that "makes an individual unfit for
the service." Id.; Kathleen M. Graham, Note. Security Clearances for Homosexuals, 25
SIrAN. L. REV. 403, 421 (1973) ("While there may be no right to public employment, or to a
security clearance, courts now recognize the right to be accorded due process of law in
being adjudged ineligible for such employment.").
114. Wentworth v. Laird, 348 F. Supp. 1153, 1156 (D.D.C. 1972).
115. Kathleen M. Graham, Note, Security Clearances for Homosexuals, 25 S'TAN. L.
REV. 403. 424 (1973).
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absence of such claims and free from the sanitizing light of judicial prod-
ding, intelligence agencies have been free to assert essentially any reason
for denying homosexual employees clearances.
Due process analysis is far more effective and clear in the context of
jobs not covered by the exemptions granted to the CIA and FBI, as
courts have required that those covered agencies (e.g., the Secret Service)
produce evidence that homosexuality actually impairs the good function-
ing and order of the agency in question.' 6 One must then ask if, in fair-
ness, it is equitable that different definitions of "due process" exist and
are acceptable for differing agencies in substantially similar fields.
VI. PRIVACY
In what can only be considered a revolutionary statement for the time,
some pre-Bowers lower courts held that there is a First Amendment right
to keep one's sex life private and that right extends to homosexual
relationships.'
The D.C. Circuit has established that the "[FBI] seems preoccupied
with what might well be thought the private lives of its employees.""'
The use of limited law enforcement resources (especially in the case of
the FBI) in order to conduct investigations into the private sexual affairs
of individuals would eventually be seen as "uncommonly silly."' 9 With
the demise of Bowers, the privacy issues surrounding the exclusion of
homosexuals must be addressed in future litigation in this area.
VII. EQUAL PROTECTION
It is evident that the most common, and perhaps most heartfelt, attack
on this exclusionary policy arises from the Equal Protection Clause of the
116. See, e.g., Soc'y for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 63 F.R.D. 399, 400 (N.D.
Cal. 1973) (distinguishing between a dismissal from the Secret Service and from another
agency based upon the employee's homosexuality), affd in part, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir.
1975).
117. Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. t373, 1376 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (observing that
there is a right to form private relationships that extends to homosexuals): Wentworth, 348
F. Supp. at 1156 ("In normal circumstances, there is a right under the First Amendment for
an individual to keep private the details of his sex life, and this applies to homosexuals,
professed or otherwise.").
118. Ashton v. Civiletti, 613 F.2d 923, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (referring to the Bureau's
employee handbook).
119. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). "Punishing
someone for expressing his sexual preference through noncommercial consensual conduct




Fourteenth Amendment. In earlier jurisprudence, the Equal Protection
Clause was seen as offering no succor to these excluded persons.12 0 It is
also important to note for the purpose of this analysis that, even with the
large amount of homosexuality-related litigation currently ongoing, the
United States Supreme Court has still never decided which level of judi-
cial scrutiny applies to homosexuals.
12 1
Most of the problems surrounding the placement of homosexuals
within the spectrum of classes for equal protection purposes centers
around the fact that no one court seems to know what type of scrutiny
homosexuals qualify for. Some courts have called for a more advanced
form of scrutiny in cases dealing with homosexuals. 2 2 At least one court
suggested an "active" standard of review.2 3 In direct reference to the
military and intelligence communities, another court adopted a "height-
ened solicitude" standard. 124  More generally, Justice O'Connor sug-
gested a "more searching form of rational basis review."'
125
The reasons for disregarding the usual deference for a more active re-
view stems from the apparent arbitrariness of rational basis review's ap-
plication to these cases. Any minor concern that the intelligence
community might have about its homosexual employees quickly becomes
an entirely rational reason for termination; thus, litigants are denied the
benefit of the colorable constitutional claim necessary to maintain an
equal protection action.
When the Supreme Court of Iowa suspected that a governmental ac-
tion was taken in order to further a deep-seated prejudice against a cer-
tain group of people, it expressly found that it is the court's judicial duty
to act in defense of that targeted minority.'2 6 Other courts have also be-
come far more willing to accept some homosexual employees' contention
that although government agencies state that their homosexual bans are
solely meant to be enforced against prohibited conduct (which would not
120. Kathleen M. Graham, Security Clearances for Homosexuals. 25 STAN. L. REV.
403, 409 (1973).
121. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 885-86 (Iowa 2009).
122. E.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 444 (Cal. 2008) (requiring that Califor-
nia courts apply strict scrutiny to all claims involving discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONs-r. art. 1, § 7.5. as recog-
nized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
123. Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 1991).
124. Watkins v. U.S. Army. 875 F.2d 699, 721 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring).
"Heightened solicitude" is not strict scrutiny: it is more akin to intermediate scrutiny. Id.
125. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558. 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
126. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 880.
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raise a constitutional issue), the bans are, in fact, aimed at outlawing an
entire class of people.'
2 7
As the jurisprudence on this issue has developed, more and more
courts have become willing to recognize the equal protection implications
of homosexual exclusion policies. 128 This is a fortuitous development for
both homosexuals and the legal community, as courts have often denied
justice to those very people who most needed the aid of their govern-
ment's guarantee of equal protection. 29 In a number of more recent
cases, courts have held that the denial of any rights pertaining to all
Americans violates equal protection without as much as a rational reason
for such discrimination.13 ° Indeed, a great many restrictions against
homosexuals make so little sense that even a rational basis test is often
sufficient to dismiss a government's "rational" explanation for its exclu-
sionary policies.
Truly revolutionary jurisprudence on the equal protection issue re-
cently occurred in Iowa. In the distant but related realm of the gay mar-
riage debate, the Iowa Supreme Court made a rather remarkable
statement. After reviewing the history of discrimination against homo-
sexuals, recent scientific investigations that strongly suggest that homo-
sexuality is immutable,' 3 ' and the fact that the political power of
homosexuals has thus far been ineffective at providing many sought-after
rights, the court concluded that governmental discrimination against
homosexuals "demand[s] closer scrutiny."132
127. E.g., Watkins, 875 F.2d at 714 (Norris, J., concurring) (arguing that a close read-
ing of the Army's regulation banning homosexuals from service reveals that the ban is
aimed at homosexual orientation, not simply at homosexual acts).
128. Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Federal and State Constitutional Provisions as
Prohibiting Discrimination on Basis of Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation or Conduct,
96 A.L.R.5th 391, 441-43 (2002).
129. See Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34
S. TEX. L. REV. 205, 249 (1993) (suggesting that homosexuals have been denied rights that
other citizens have not).
130. E.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (determining that a Colorado
constitutional amendment prohibiting any legislation designed to protect homosexual per-
sons from discrimination impermissibly discriminated against homosexuals' rights under
the federal Equal Protection Clause).
131. Cf M.K.B. Darmer & Tiffany Chang, Moving Beyond the "Immutability Debate"
in the Fight for Equality After Proposition 8, 12 SCHOLAR 1, 2 (2009) (questioning the
continued utility of the irreconcilable "immutability debate").




We must now investigate the current status of homosexuals vis-A-vis the
traditional three-pronged equal protection test applied to suspect classifi-
cations, which is articulated in Conaway v. Deane.'
33
The first prong of suspect class analysis requires proof of political inef-
ficacy or powerlessness, 134 which is where-many attempts to fit homosex-
uals under stricter forms of scrutiny have historically failed.
35
Problematically, the Supreme Court has never defined or clarified the
exact meaning of "political power," thus leaving individual courts and
states to grope around in the dark for a suitable definition. 136 Most of the
time, these challenges fail because the courts fail to take into considera-
tion the detrimental effects of the "closet." This closet, which is a com-
mon term used to describe non-admitted homosexuals, effectively
divorces a large number of potentially powerful homosexuals from the
133. 932 A.2d 571, 606 (Md. 2007).
There is no brightline diagnostic, annunciated by either this [clourt or the U.S. Su-
preme Court, by which a suspect or quasi-suspect class may be recognized readily.
There are, however, several indicia of suspect or quasi-suspect classes that have been
used in Supreme Court cases to determine whether a legislative classification warrants
a more exacting constitutional analysis than that provided by rational basis review.
These factors include: (1) whether the group of people disadvantaged by a statute
display a readily-recognizable, "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics
.that define the group as a "discrete and insular minorit[y]"; (2) whether the
impacted group is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerless-
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process":
and (3) whether the class of people singled out is "subjected to unique disabilities on
the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities [to contrib-
ute meaningfully to society]."
Id. (second and third alterations in original) (footnotes omitted).
134. Id.; see also Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring) (explaining that this factor asks whether the group that is encumbered by offi-
cial discrimination has the political power that is needed to obtain redress from govern-
ment agencies or branches).
135. See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 894 (stating that because gays and lesbians have suc-
cessfully petitioned for many legal protections, they do not constitute a politically power-
less group); Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 609 (Md. 2007) (holding that the political
power of homosexuals is sufficient to not classify homosexuals as a suspect class).
While gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons in recent history have been the target of
unequal treatment in the private and public aspects of their lives, and have been sub-
ject to stereotyping in ways not indicative of their abilities, among other things, to
work and raise a child, recent legislative and judicial trends toward reversing various
forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation underscore an increasing political
coming of age.
Conaway, 932 A.2d at 613.
136. Conaway, 932 A.2d at 607.
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political process.' 3 7 There can be little debate that some homosexuals,
due to their fear of adverse consequences and discrimination, choose not
to identify with their peer group and, therefore, adversely affect the polit-
ical power of the entire minority. 3 "
Additionally, the number of individuals comprising the homosexual mi-
nority suggests that their actual political power is not concomitant to their
expected power.' 39 This results in an unfortunate circular reasoning
problem, wherein homosexuals can only gain their rightful political
power through visibility in the general population, but they cannot be-
come fully free to be visible in the general population without gaining
greater political power.14 This powerlessness extends even to heterosex-
ual supporters of homosexual employees in the military and intelligence
fields-no soldier or intelligence officer (even the most empathetic)
would want to be "caught" supporting homosexual causes or with homo-
sexual friends for fear of being labeled homosexual him- or herself. 4 '
Finally, several courts have recently held that a group's political
powerlessness need not be current in order to qualify for enhanced scru-
137. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 727 (Norris, J., concurring) (acknowledging the social and
political pressures that encourage concealment of one's homosexuality and the effects
those pressures have on the willingness of homosexuals to openly protest anti-gay legisla-
tion); see also Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened
Scrutiny for Gays. 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1797 (1996) (discussing the immobilizing im-
pact closeted homosexuals have on gay political goals). The actuality of being in the closet
has less than desirable consequences. Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argul-
ment for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1800 (1996). Closeted
homosexuals tend to lead a "cloistered life" and ultimately drain those actively pursuing
equal protection rights. Id. at 1801. An argument can be made that homosexuals prefer
the safety provided by staying in the closet, yet, could enjoy a greater universal safety only
if they would step out to help fight the fight. Id.
138. Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny
for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1801 (1996).
139. In the United States. out of more than 500.000 individuals holding public office at
the national, state, and local levels, approximately three hundred are openly gay. Kerrigan
v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 477 (Conn. 2008). No individual publicly identi-
fying his- or herself as homosexual has ever been appointed to a federal appeals court or
cabinet position. Id. Nor has such an individual ever served as a United States Senator.
Id. "In [Connecticut]. no openly gay person ever has been elected to statewide office, and
only five of the 187 members of the state legislature are openly gay or lesbian." Id. (em-
phasis in original) (citation omitted).
140. Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny
for Gays. 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1801 (1996).
141. Ben-Shalom v. Sec'y of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 974 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (hold-
ing unconstitutional an Army regulation permitting discharge of soldiers evidencing homo-
sexual tendencies, desires, or interests), affd in part, 776 F.2d 1049 (7th Cir. 1985).
20101
THE SCHOLAR
tiny.'4 2 This is because there are many groups recognized under the
quasi-suspect and fully suspect classes that are now politically powerful' 4 3
(one could not contend otherwise, with the influence that the NAACP
and the National Organization for Women currently have within our po-
litical system, in addition to the more obvious fact that we have an Afri-
can-American"' president).
B. Mutability
The first prong also asks if the group's defining characteristic is immu-
table and, hence, "discrete" in the more classical meaning of that term.' 45
This is an area of great debate in relation to homosexuality (and, indeed,
for the intelligence community as well), and courts have come to many
different conclusions about immutability. Traditionally, most courts held
that homosexuality is not an immutable trait, such as race or gender, but
is "primarily behavioral in nature."'4 6 These courts found homosexuality
to be entirely behavioral in nature and, thus, not relevant to the investiga-
tion of immutability. 47
Today, some note that even if sexual orientation is not fully immutable,
it nonetheless forms part of the core of a person's being and may be
142. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional
amendment. CAL. CONs-r. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal.
2009): Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 440-41; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 894 (Iowa 2009).
143. See Kerrigan. 957 A.2d at 441 ("As the plaintiffs also emphasize, courts continue
to apply heightened scrutiny to statutes that discriminate against women and racial minori-
ties notwithstanding the great strides that both groups have made and continue to make in
recent years in terms of their political strength.").
144. Cf Gloria J. Liddell et al.. Is Obama Black? The Pseudo-Legal Definition of the
Black Race: A Proposal for Regulatory Clarification Generated from a Historical Socio-
Political Perspective, 12 SCHOLAR 213, 216-17 (2010) (discussing the disagreement over
whether the forty-fourth president is "Black," "African-American," or something else).
The authors ultimately conclude that, per their proposed definition, President Obama is,
indeed, both "Black" and "African-American," id. at 258, but they recognize the uncom-
fortable fact that by defining a mixed-race individual exclusively by his "Black half." the
nation is, perhaps, continuing to embrace the old "one-drop rule" espoused in Plessy v.
Ferguson. Id. at 216-17.
145. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 606 (Md. 2007); see also Varnun, 763 N.W.2d
at 893 (Iowa 2009) ("Immutability may [serve to] separate truly victimized individuals from
those who have invited discrimination by changing themselves so as to be identified with
the group.").
146. E.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (asserting
that homosexuality is fundamentality different than the traits that define suspect and quasi-
suspect classes).
147. E.g., id. ("Members of recognized suspect or quasi-suspect classes, e.g., blacks or
women, exhibit immutable characteristics, whereas homosexuality is primarily behavioral
in nature ... The conduct or behavior of the members of a recognized suspect or quasi-
suspect class has no relevance to the identification of those groups." (citations omitted)).
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highly resistant to change. 4 8 Indeed, the most recent cases on the issue
have established a trend toward accepting the immutability of homosexu-
ality and, in any event, finding immutability to be less than an absolute
determination.' 4 9 Moreover, if immutability is the standard, one judge
humorously posited whether racial discrimination would become appro-
priate if medical science found an easy way to change one's skin color.'50
He concluded that the converse question on immutability must be asked:
"[I]t seems appropriate to ask whether heterosexuals feel capable of
changing their sexual orientation. '
Additionally a multitude of scientific discoveries building upon years of
work and study in this field support the proposition that homosexuality is
fully immutable.' In any event, the steady erosion of immutability's re-
lation to equal protection has rendered it increasingly irrelevant.' 53
C. History of Discrimination
Courts generally do not dispute that homosexuals suffer from a long
history of discrimination. 54 Even in today's more permissive environ-
ment, homosexuals continue to suffer from open and obvious discrimina-
148. E.g., Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concur-
ring) (stating that the Supreme Court treats a trait as immutable if altering that trait would
entail massive physical change or enormous difficulty): Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp.
850, 863-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing an increase in scientific research supporting the con-
clusion that sexual orientation can be immutable for some individuals), rev'd on other
grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2008)
("Because a person's sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one's identity, it is not
appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in
order to avoid discriminatory treatment." (citation omitted)), superseded by constitutional
amendment, CAL. CONsT. art. i, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal.
2009).
149. Sexual orientation has a strong correlation with an individual's personal identity,
and while sexual orientation can be altered, the alteration can be devastating to the indi-
vidual's self-conception. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 893 (Iowa 2009).
150. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726 (Norris, J., concurring).
151. Id. (emphasis in original).
152. Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34 S.
TEX. L. REv. 205, 241-42 (1993). According to one study, "[Forty-eight] percent of the
identical twin sisters of lesbians were gay, compared with just [sixteen] percent of the fra-
ternal twin sisters of lesbians." David Tuller, Lesbian Study of Twins Finds Genetic Link,
S.F. CHRON., Mar. 12, 1993, at A21, available at 1993 WLNR 2634880.
153. See discussion of M.K.B. Darmer & Tiffany Chang, Moving Beyond the "Immu-
tability Debate" in the Fight for Equality After Proposition 8, 12 SCHOLAR 1 (2009) in foot-
note 131 of this Essay.
154. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 610 (Md. 2007) (outlining instances of overt
discrimination against homosexuals). During the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, homosexuals
were criminally prosecuted for any public display of affection. Id. Some states would sanc-
tion alcohol-purveying establishments for serving homosexuals. Id. "It is clear that homo-
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tion that continues to result in regular "gay bashings" of fellow citizens.
Indeed, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of
Public Health specifically noted that for all intents and purposes, the dis-
crimination homosexuals face today is of the same exact type from which
African-Americans and women in our country have historically suf-
fered.'55 Therefore, the second prong of the test-a history of discrimi-
nation-is not usually debated in today's courtrooms. 156 But the fact that
the Iowa Supreme Court in Varnum v. Brien sought to use the history of
discrimination against homosexuals in the intelligence community as
proof of the history of discrimination homosexuals must face under the
first prong of the test 57 is, indeed, quite humorous in the context of this
Essay.
D. "Discrete and Insular"
The third prong of this test concerns whether the minority in question
is "discrete and insular."'158 The fact that "closeted" homosexuals exist-
and are an "anonymous and diffuse" group by their very nature-can
potentially undercut any claim to this third prong. A prescient counter-
example is that for the majority of homosexuals who are "out," they are
often found in discrete communities (current-day prejudice often forces
homosexuals into the protective arms of these communities), which are
necessarily insular by definition.' 59 Generally, this test fails to capture
the unique circumstances of the homosexual community, in that it is both
"discrete and insular" and "anonymous and diffuse."' 6 ° A better test
must be used to judge the third prong in relation to homosexuals' right to
sexual persons, at least in terms of contemporary history, have been a disfavored group in
both public and private spheres of our society." Id.
155. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407. 433 (Conn. 2008) (citation
omitted).
156. But, as the Conaway court explained, a finding of a history of discrimination
alone does not raise the level of scrutiny to be applied. Conaway, 932 A.2d at 610.
157. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 889 (Iowa 2009).
158. Conaway, 932 A.2d at 606; see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) ("[W]hether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities ... may call for a correspond-
ingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
159. Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny
for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1809 (1996). Homosexuals face many daily hurdles that
encourage them to band together in established gay networks. Id. The daily struggle with
homosexual misrepresentations is one of the many results of the gay community having
little, if any, political power. Id.
160. See id. at 1811 (analyzing the difficulty in using the "discrete and insular" test to
gauge political power because of the varied descriptions used for homosexuals); see also
Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34 S. TEX. L.
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equal protection: it is a failure of law, not of the minority seeking
protection.
E. Rationality
Even if we reject the above analysis, the current restrictions against
homosexuals fail even the most basic rational basis test. Taken in the
context of a case dealing with military intelligence (as was the case in
Watkins v. U.S. Army, where the plaintiff was repeatedly promoted and
granted security clearances despite his admitted homosexuality), 6 ' the
question of whether homosexuality has any rational impact on the intelli-
gence services whatsoever must be addressed. One must recognize that it
seems that restrictions against homosexuals are merely "prejudice and in-
accurate stereotypes . . . [an] indicia of a classification's gross
unfairness."162
Also note that there seems to be no effect on a person's ability to con-
tribute to society if he or she is homosexual. 163 The Buttino court ex-
pressly rejected previous cases dealing with this issue as being ineffective
in establishing that the FBI's policy is automatically rational as a matter
of law; indeed, the court suggests that the use of cases reflecting an out-
dated understanding of homosexuality may be an attempt to silence
homosexuals through the use of precedent. 64 In addition to a growing
realization that automatic, arbitrary discrimination against homosexuals
is often prima facie irrational, several state courts have also started plac-
ing homosexuals in heightened classes of scrutiny for purposes of Four-
teenth Amendment analysis. 165
VIII. CONCLUSION
My review of the history of homosexual exclusion from the military
and civilian intelligence services in the United States has covered the
REv. 205, 244 (1993) (arguing that homosexuals should be regarded as a unique group
requiring a different test).
161. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1989).
162. Id. at 725 (Norris, J., concurring).
163. Id.
164. See Buttino v. FBI, 801 F. Supp. 298, 307 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (citing High Tech Gays
v, Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied (July 23,
1990)) ("High Tech Gays does not compel a finding (on this motion for summary judg-
ment) that the FBI's discrimination against gays, as alleged by Mr. Buttino, is rational as a
matter of law.").
165. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 441-42 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitu-
tional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48
(Cal. 2009): Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432 (Conn. 2008), Varnum
v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 896 (Iowa 2009).
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wide range of litigation that has occurred in an impressively short amount
of time. Only since J. Edgar Hoover (rumored, ironically enough, to be a
homosexual)166 led the FBI in the 1950s, has this issue even been in con-
tention. In response, the government imposed a series of restrictions and
policies that largely remain in effect today.
Certainly, a great many things changed in six short decades. The status
of homosexuals in society and in government has undergone a massive
shift during this time. This progress (or advance of immorality, depend-
ing on one's position on the issues involved) is now occurring at an ex-
tremely rapid pace.' 67 It seems, however, that large areas of government
have remained beholden to ideas that many courts now recognize are
simply outdated.
Were it just the case that the current position of the government is
simply imprudent and unwise, these restrictions might be overlooked.
But these policies have a clearly detrimental effect both upon the security
of the United States, as well as upon the individuals affected by these
rules in both the public and private spheres. While our nation is engaged
in a great conflict over terrorism in many areas of the world, homosexual
personnel who have expertise in these areas are being discouraged from
joining the fight or are being drummed out of the battle not for their
disloyalty or incompetence, but because they love the wrong person. In
an age in which gays and lesbians are winning the battle for respect, the
government they seek redress from seems deaf to the pleas of its own
citizens.
Homosexuals have served this country honorably since its founding. In
the darkest hour of the American Revolution, the country was saved by a
homosexual Prussian by the name of Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben at
Valley Forge.' 68 Homosexuals will not celebrate the election of their first
president in the future, as that has possibly already occurred, and homo-
sexuals may also celebrate those other great gay Americans in our his-
tory, one of whom (allegedly) is now celebrated on our ten dollar bill.'6 9
Homosexuals did not stop serving our country after it made clear that it
166. Frank Rich, The Plot Against Sex in America, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, at 21,
available at 2004 WLNR 13838003.
167. In fact, this Essay went through numerous revisions as a result of recent events in
California, Iowa, Maine, New Hampshire, Washington, and Wisconsin.
168. WILLIAM BENEMANN, MALE-MALE INTIMACY IN EARLY AMERICA 97 (2006).
169. JONATHAN KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LES1I3ANS ANi) GAY MEN IN THE
U.S.A. 451 (1976) (analyzing whether Alexander Hamilton's letters to John Laurens reveal
a homosocial or homosexual relationship). The contemporary meaning of Hamilton's let-
ters is difficult to discern because some of the language may be formal, literary convention,
rather than an expression of homosexual feelings. Id. The author notes that even if Hamil-
ton's language reflects no homosexual relationship, the mere permissibility of such lan-
guage suggests that male-male intimacy was more accepted at that time. Id.
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did not wish them to help-the first person injured in the recent war in
Iraq was Marine Staff Sgt. Eric Alva, an openly gay man from San
Antonio. 170
This recital of our history goes to prove one point-our country is
greatly weakened by the continuing ban of homosexuals from the intelli-
gence community, and if we are to improve our nation's security, the le-
gal system must do that which executive orders and legislative inattention
have so far failed to do.
I have had those feelings, those longings, all of my life. It is not unnat-
ural. I am not sick because I feel this way. I do not need to be helped.
I do not need to be cured. What I need, and what all of those who are
like me need, is your understanding. And your compassion. We have
not injured you in any way. And yet we are scorned and attacked.
And all because we are different. What we do is no different from
what you do. We talk about our families and we worry about the fit-
ture. All of the loving things that you do with each other-that is what
we do. And for that we are called misfits, and deviants and criminals.
What right do you have to punish its? What right do you have to
change us? What makes you think you can dictate how people love
each other?7 '
170. Human Rights Campaign-Eric Alva: Coming Out Against Don't Ask, Don't
Tell, http://www.hrc.org/alva/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). On March 21, 2003, Eric Alva
"was traveling in Iraq in a convoy to Basra with his battalion when he stepped on a
landmine, breaking his right arm and damaging his leg so badly that it needed to be ampu-
tated." Id. He was subsequently awarded a Purple Heart and was then honorably dis-
charged from the military for medical reasons. Id. After his discharge, Alva "came out,"
and has since expressed opposition to "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." Id.
171. Star Trek: The Next Generation: The Outcast (Syndicated television broadcast
Mar. 16, 1992).
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